Schedule 14 - Persons to whom copies of requirements to be provided in particular cases

824.     This Schedule sets out who is to receive copies of each different requirement, in addition to the persons mentioned in section 219.

Schedule 18: Release of prisoners serving sentences of imprisonment or detention for public protection

825.     This Schedule amends the provisions of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 relating to the release of prisoners serving life sentences so that they also apply to prisoners serving the new sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection. Paragraph 2 inserts a new section 31A, which provides that after 10 years has elapsed following the release of an offender serving a sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection (see sections 225 and 226), the offender may apply to the Parole Board for his licence to be terminated. If the Parole Board is satisfied that no further risk is posed then it must recommend to the Secretary of State that the licence be terminated. If the Parole Board concludes that the offender continues to pose a risk then it must reject the application and the offender may not submit another application until at least 12 months has elapsed.

Schedule 19: The Parole Board: supplementary provisions

826.     The Schedule re-enacts Schedule 5 to the Criminal Justice Act 1991, which contains supplementary provisions about the Parole Board. The members of the Board must include representatives from certain professional fields. The Schedule also contains provisions about the payment of members, the funding of the Board and the keeping of proper records and accounts amongst other things.

Schedule 20: Prisoners liable to removal from the United Kingdom: modifications of the Criminal Justice Act 1991

827.     Schedule 20 provides for an early removal scheme similar to that in sections 260 and 261 of this Act to be applied to those sentenced under the Criminal Justice Act 1991. The scheme is the same in substance as that set out in amendments sections 260 and 261 and any differences simply reflect the differences between the provisions of this Act and the Criminal Justice Act 1991. For example, in this Act the definition of the requisite period to be served before a prisoner may become eligible for early removal from prison is set out in terms of custodial periods only. For prisoners sentenced under the provisions of the 1991 Act the requisite period is defined as a proportion of the term of imprisonment - which includes the custodial and licence period.

Schedule 21: Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentences

828.     This Schedule sets out the principles which a sentencing court must have regard to when assessing the seriousness of all cases of murder in order to determine the appropriate minimum term to be imposed.

829.     Paragraph 1 is definitional and is largely self-explanatory. Paragraphs 2 and 3 explain what is meant by racial or religious aggravation or aggravation by sexual orientation.

830.     Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 set out the starting points that a court should adopt when determining a minimum term. The starting point may be adjusted in accordance with the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors in order to arrive at the finally determined minimum term.

Paragraph 4

831.     This paragraph deals with the small numbers of exceptionally serious cases in which the court should normally start by considering a whole life term, and provides a number of examples of cases that should normally require consideration of a whole life order. The list is not intended to be exhaustive, but indicates that murders that fall within the given categories will normally require a whole life minimum term. However, in an individual case it could be appropriate for a court to commence the determination of the appropriate minimum term with the whole life starting point but, upon further consideration of the relevant circumstances of the case, ultimately decide that a whole life term is not required. In keeping with sentencing practice generally, it is entirely a matter for the sentencing court to determine the facts upon which it is to sentence.

Paragraph 5

832.     Paragraph 5 deals with the murders which are not as serious as those that fall within paragraph 4 but are nevertheless particularly grave and require a starting point for determining the minimum term of 30 years. Like paragraph 4 this paragraph provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of cases that should normally require consideration of a 30 year starting point. This starting point may be adjusted up, or down, in accordance with the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors. A murder falling within the paragraph 5(2), may nevertheless be one that the court decides is exceptionally serious and more appropriately dealt with under paragraph 4(1) rather than 5(1).

833.     Paragraph 5(2)(h) allows a court to adopt a 30 year starting point for an offender who is 18, 19 or 20 years old and, under current provision, subject to a sentence of mandatory custody for life.

Paragraphs 6 and 7

834.     The numbers of murders falling within paragraphs 4 and 5 will form a relatively small although significant proportion of all the murders that come before the courts. The majority of murders will therefore attract a starting point of 15 years under paragraph 6. Paragraph 7 provides a separate starting point of 12 years for offenders aged under 18 at the time the offence was committed.

Paragraphs 8 to 12

835.     Once a starting point has been chosen, the court will then go on to consider factors that either increase or reduce the seriousness of the murder and make the necessary adjustments to arrive at the final minimum term. There is no restriction on the degree of adjustment that a court can make in consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors, as paragraph 8 explains. Although, therefore, there may be a few very exceptional cases in which starting points will be increased or decreased very substantially, it is expected that the vast majority of cases will tend to attract minimum terms that reflect the categorisation of cases set out in paragraphs 4 to 7.

836.     Paragraph 8 makes it clear that aggravating or mitigating factors cannot be double counted. If a murder, for example, fell within paragraph 5(2) because it was the murder of a police officer, the minimum term could not be increased beyond the starting point of 30 years on the basis that the case was aggravated by facts falling within paragraph 10 (f).

837.     The list of factors that are to be regarded as aggravating set out at paragraph 10 is non-exhaustive and is provided by way of example. These examples are additional to those set out at paragraphs 4(2) and 5(2) so that any factor that does not determine the relevant starting point can be taken account under paragraph 8. Planning and premeditation requires inclusion at 10(a) because a court will want to take into account premeditation and planning of any degree and reliance on the reference at paragraph 4(2)(a)(i) would only include facts that amounted to a substantial degree of premeditation or planning. Other matters are included in paragraph 10, for example paragraphs (c) and (f), because they embrace but have a greater scope than facts that would fall within paragraphs 4(2) and 5(2). Paragraph 10 (g) covers circumstances in which the court is satisfied that, in those rare cases of convictions for murder in the absence of a body, the offender is adding to the grief of a victim's family by deliberately preventing the recovery of the body.

838.     Paragraph 11 sets out a number of factors that may be taken account of by the sentencing court as mitigating factors. Once again this list is not exhaustive and provides examples only. The list covers most of the mitigating factors that are likely to arise in cases of murder and is largely self-explanatory. As regards paragraph 11(a), it may not be commonly appreciated that the offence of murder does not require an intention to kill. In the case of offenders who are considerably younger than 18, paragraph 11(g) may have a very significant effect on the final determination of the minimum term.

839.     Paragraph 12 makes it clear that nothing in these principles affects the general provisions in the Act on the effect of previous convictions, offending while on bail and pleas of guilty.

Schedule 22 : Mandatory Life Sentences: Transitional Cases

840.     This Schedule deals with transitional matters. In particular it sets out arrangements to deal with:

a)     convicted murderers serving minimum terms determined by the Secretary of State;

b)     those already sentenced for murder but awaiting the determination of a minimum term;

c)     minimum terms determined on or after commencement of section 269 in respect of offences committed before that date.

Paragraph 1

841.     Paragraph 1 contains various definitions. These are self-explanatory save that it should be noted that the definition of "mandatory life sentence" excludes juveniles sentenced to mandatory detention during Her Majesty's Pleasure. This is because minimum terms for juveniles convicted of murder that were fixed by the Secretary of State are already subject to a review by the Lord Chief Justice established following the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of V v UK (Judgement of ECHR of 16th December 1999).

Existing prisoners notified by Secretary of State: Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4

842.     These paragraphs deal with prisoners who are already serving a life sentence subject to a minimum term, or whole life term, which has been fixed by the Secretary of State. In accordance with the ruling in the case of Anderson, and in seeking to afford the prisoners their rights under Article 6 of the Convention, this provision offers these prisoners an opportunity to apply to have their minimum term re-set by the High Court. Having reviewed a case, the High Court must reconsider the existing minimum term or whole life term. In so doing the court can order a period that is equal to that which was set by the Secretary of State or it may reduce the minimum term. It cannot however, increase the minimum term fixed by the Secretary of State.

843.     Some prisoners serving life sentences will remain in prison although the minimum term fixed by the Secretary of State has expired. This group is excluded from the right to apply to the High Court, but paragraph 3(3) enables them to have their cases considered by the Parole Board.

844.     Not all prisoners will necessarily wish to apply for a new minimum term. In this case the minimum term fixed by the Secretary of State in their case will remain effective.

845.     Paragraph 4 sets out in general terms the matters the court should have regard to when determining the appropriate minimum term in any individual case. In addition to the consideration of seriousness and time spent on remand required in every case under section 269, in these transitional cases the existing notified minimum term or whole life term will also be relevant. Paragraph 4(2) requires the reviewing court, when considering the seriousness of the offence, to have regard to both the principles set out in Schedule 21 and any judicial recommendations, made shortly after the original conviction, as to the appropriate minimum term to be served by the prisoner.

Existing prisoners not notified by Secretary of State: Paragraphs 5 to 8

846.     Since the judgement in Anderson ([2002] UKHL 46) the Home Secretary has not determined any minimum terms. Accordingly, there are a number of cases in which the prisoner has been found guilty of murder and sentenced to the mandatory life sentence but still awaits the determination of a minimum term. Paragraph 6 creates a duty on the part of the Home Secretary to refer these cases to the High Court for the determination of a minimum term under the provision at section 269.

847.     In keeping with the provision for future cases, the reviewing court must take into guidelines account the new statutory principles and any relevant guidelines when considering the seriousness of the case for the purpose of determining the minimum term. Any recommendations made by either the Lord Chief Justice or the trial judge also need to be taken into account by the High Court when determining the minimum term.

848.     To ensure compatibility with Article 7 of the Convention, paragraph 8(a) prevents the High Court from determining the minimum term at a level greater than that which would have been imposed under the practice of the Secretary of State before the Anderson judgement. Paragraph 8(b) also makes it clear that no whole life term can be imposed unless such a term would, in the court's opinion, have been imposed by the Secretary of State.

Sentences passed on or after commencement date in respect of offences committed before that date: Paragraphs 9 and 10

849.     Some trials for murder after the commencement of these provisions will concern murders that were committed before commencement. Paragraphs 9 and 10 deal with such cases. The need to avoid imposing a sentence that is greater than that which would have been available at the time of the commission of the offence applies here as much as it does to the cases covered in the preceding paragraphs. Accordingly, paragraph 10 imposes a restriction equivalent to that in paragraph 8.

Paragraph 11

850.     Paragraph 11 provides for any review or determination of a minimum term under either paragraphs 3 or 6 by the High Court to be undertaken by a single judge on the papers.

Paragraphs 12 to 18

851.     Paragraph 12 requires a court reviewing an existing minimum term to give reasons for the order it makes and if the order specifies a minimum term that is shorter than that imposed by the Secretary of State to explain its reasons for doing so. Where a court determines the minimum term in the case of a convicted prisoner who has not been given a minimum term by the Home Secretary, paragraph 13 brings the duty to give reasons into line with that under paragraph 12.

852.     Paragraph 14 extends rights of appeal to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, if appropriate, to prisoners who have either had their minimum term reviewed or determined by the High Court under these transitional provisions. Paragraph 15 extends section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to these transitional arrangements and provides for a means by which the Attorney General can challenge a minimum term which he considers unduly lenient.

853.     Paragraph 16 ensures that the early release provisions apply consistently to both a minimum term in arising from a review of an existing minimum term by the High Court and those minimum terms fixed by the Home Secretary that remain effective if no application is made. Paragraph 17 ensures that transferred prisoners may be dealt with under these transitional arrangements if necessary.

Schedule 23: Deferment of sentence

854.     This Schedule inserts new provisions about deferment of sentence into the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. In most cases, a court will pass sentence on an offender immediately after his conviction for the offence or offences for which he is before the court. However, the court also has the power to defer sentencing. As at present, the new provisions allow the court to defer sentencing for the purpose of enabling the court to have regard to the conduct of the offender and any change in his circumstances. However, it strengthens the deferred sentence by providing for reparative and other activity to be undertaken during the period of deferment, and extends "conduct" to include reference to how well the offender complies with such requirements. Progress will continue to act as a mitigating factor in the final sentence passed, including imposing a community sentence in lieu of a custodial one when clear progress against undertakings has been made. Sentencing can be deferred only if the offender consents and undertakes to comply with any requirements set out by the court, and only where the court considers that deferment is in the interests of justice. The court cannot remand an offender if it also defers his sentence. As currently, sentence cannot be deferred for more than six months. The court has the power to issue a summons or a warrant to arrest the offender if he does not appear on the date for sentencing specified by the court. Subsection (5) of the new section prescribes who should receive a copy of the order deferring the passing of sentence.

855.     Under new section 1A the court can include requirements regarding the offender's residence. If an offender is to undertake requirements the court may appoint a supervisor to monitor the offender's compliance with the requirements. The supervisor can be an officer of the local probation board or anyone else the court thinks appropriate. The person must consent to being a supervisor. The supervisor must provide the court with information as to the offender's compliance with the requirements, as it wishes.

856.     Under new section 1B the court may deal with the offender before the end of the period of deferment if it is satisfied that the offender has failed to comply with one or more requirements. Currently, as there are no requirements attached to deferred sentences, the offender can only be returned to court early for sentencing if he commits another offence. Subsection (2) sets out the circumstances in which he can be returned to court early. Subsection (3) gives the court the power to issue a summons or warrant for the offender to appear before it.

857.     Under new section 1C the court may deal with an offender before the end of the period of deferment if he commits another offence. Subsections (2) and (3) set out the powers of the Crown Court and magistrates' courts in these cases. If the offender is convicted of another offence during the period of deferment, the court may deal with the original deferred sentence at the same time as sentencing the offender for the new offence. If the original sentence was deferred by a Crown Court, it must be a Crown Court that passes sentence for both the offences. If the original sentence was deferred by a magistrates court, and the offender is brought before a Crown Court to be sentenced for the two offences, the Crown Court cannot pass a sentence greater than a magistrates court could have passed. That is, it cannot pass a sentence of greater than 12 months. The court has power to issue a summons or a warrant for the offender to appear before it.

858.     New section 1D clarifies some of the legal detail surrounding the deferment of sentences. Deferment of sentence is to be regarded as an adjournment, and if the offender does not appear before the court when required to he is to be dealt with accordingly. When the court deals with an offender at the end of the period of deferment (or earlier if he does not comply with the requirements or commits another offence) it has the same powers as if the offence had just been committed. This includes committing him for sentence to the Crown Court. The court may issue a summons to someone appointed as a supervisor if that person refuses to appear before the court when the court wants to consider an offender's failure to comply with the requirements of the deferment or anything to do with the original offence.

Schedule 24: Drug treatment and testing requirement in action plan order or supervision order

859.     This Schedule amends section 70 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. It introduces drug treatment, which may include testing, as a requirement available for inclusion in an action plan order. The Schedule also amends Schedule 6 to the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 to allow drug treatment, which may include testing, as a requirement available for inclusion in a supervision order.

860.     The new requirement is available where the court is satisfied that the young offender is dependent on, or has a propensity to misuse, drugs and that this dependency or propensity is such as requires and may be susceptible to treatment. The Schedule strengthens the existing interventions available to the court to assist young offenders with a drug misuse problem to address both their drug misuse and offending behaviour. The testing element of the requirement can only apply to those aged 14 years and over and can be included in an action plan order or supervision order only if the offender consents and the court has been notified by the Secretary of State that arrangements are in place for implementation.

Schedule 25: Summary offences no longer punishable with imprisonment

861.     Schedule 25 provides a list of summary offences which, following commencement of section 267, will cease to be punishable with imprisonment. In effect, this will mean that the maximum penalties for these offences will be the new generic community sentence and/or a fine. In connection to this, Part 2 of Schedule 32 makes the necessary consequential amendments to the relevant enactments. Part 7 of Schedule 37 contains associated repeals.

     Schedule 26: Increase in maximum term for certain summary offences

862.     Schedule 26 makes the necessary consequential amendments so as to increase the maximum penalty for certain summary offences from a term of imprisonment of five months or less to a term of 51 weeks (equating to a full sentence of custody plus - see section 181).

Schedule 27: Enabling powers: alteration of maximum penalties etc.

863.     Schedule 27 makes the necessary changes to specific enabling powers contained within existing legislation so as to ensure that the offences that these powers may create have maximum penalties that are compatible with the new sentencing framework.

Schedule 28: Increase in penalties for drug-related offences

864.     Schedule 28 amends Schedule 4 to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and related legislation to increase the penalties for offences committed in relation to Class C drugs. The provisions include an increase to the maximum penalties for trafficking Class C drugs from 5 to 14 years' imprisonment.

Schedule 30: Disqualification from working with children

865.     Part 2 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 already requires the court to make an order disqualifying the offender from working with children on conviction for an "offence against a child", as defined in section 26 by reference to the list in Schedule 4 of the Act, where a sentence of imprisonment or detention for 12 months or more is imposed. In relation to adult offenders, a disqualification order must be made unless the court is satisfied that it is unlikely the individual will commit any further offence. In the case of offenders aged under 18, the court must make the order if it is satisfied that it is likely a further offence against a child will be committed.

866.     Paragraph 2 of this Schedule inserts new sections 29A and 29B into the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000.

867.     New section 29A extends the court's powers by adding a discretion to make an order if it is satisfied that it is likely a further offence against a child will be committed, even though the sentence threshold specified in the Act is not met. The test of whether the order should be made is whether the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that it is likely that the individual will commit a further offence against a child. If the court makes a disqualification order, it must both state and record its reasons for doing so. These provisions add to but do not otherwise change the existing provisions in the Act relating to cases in which the sentencing threshold is met.

868.     New section 29B has the effect that where a court was under a duty to consider the issue of a disqualification order, by virtue of convicting the offender of a relevant offence and passing a sentence which met the threshold specified, but appeared not to have done so nor to have recorded its reasons for this, the prosecution has discretion at any time in the future to apply to a senior court for a disqualification order to be made. The court will then have to consider, on the basis of further evidence and argument if necessary, whether the test that the offender is likely to commit an offence is met and whether an order should be made. Where it considers the test is met in respect of an adult, it must make an order or, if it does not do so, must record the reasons for this decision. Where the offender is aged under 18 years, the court must make an order if it is satisfied that the offender is likely to commit a further offence against a child and must record its reasons for this decision. New section 29B applies to cases in which a court was under a duty to consider a disqualification order, i.e. to senior courts passing qualifying sentences on offenders convicted of an offence under Schedule 4 of in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, after the implementation on January 11^th 2001 of the relevant provisions in that Act.

Schedule 31: Default orders: modification of provisions relating to community orders

869.     This Schedule must be read in conjunction with section 300 which gives the court to impose an unpaid work requirement or a curfew requirement, in lieu of imprisonment, where an offender has defaulted on the payment of a fine, and has a default order imposed on him.

870.     Paragraph 2 modifies the unpaid work provisions in section 199 so that the minimum number of hours which a person may be required to work as part of a default order is 20 hours and the maximum is laid out in the Table in paragraph 2 corresponding to the amount of the sum in default.

871.     Paragraph 3 makes similar modifications to the provisions of the curfew requirement under section 204 and lays out in a table the maximum number of days to which the offender subject to a default order can be subject, which correspond to the amount of the sum in default.

872.     Paragraph 4 modifies the enforcement, revocation and amendment provisions in Schedule 7 to make them apply to the default order. If an offender breaches his default order, the court can deal with him in any way in which the court which made the default order could deal with him for the original default. In other words, it can commit him to custody. Paragraph 6 modifies Schedule 9 (transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland) to allow default orders to be transferred to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

873.     Paragraph 5 provides the Secretary of State with an order-making power to amend the number of amounts of money specified in the tables under paragraphs 2 and 3 and the number of hours or days specified.